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Abstract: Twentieth-century anthropology has been operating with the 
assumption of one nature and many cultures, one reality experienced and lived 
in many different ways. Its primary job, therefore, has been to render the 
otherness of the other understandable, to demonstrate that although different it 
is also the same, in short, to show that although other, others are people like us. 
The latest theoretical paradigm, known as the ‘ontological turn’, appears to 
reverse this assumption and to posit many natures and one culture. Whether it 
does in fact reverse it and constitutes a meta-ontology, as critics have pointed 
out, or it is only a heuristic, methodological device, as some of the proponents of 
the ‘turn’ have recently argued, the contention of my paper is the same: firstly, 
this move—the ontological—is made in the hope of doing a better job in 
redeeming otherness than earlier anthropological paradigms; secondly, it fails as 
they did—in the same way and for the same reasons.  
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There has been a lively debate in anthropology that revolves around a new 
theory of the other, what has come to be known as ‘the ontological turn’. To 
understand what is at stake in this debate it is necessary to probe deep into the 
discipline, examine the cultural assumptions with which it operates, the problem 
it is seeking to solve, the predicament in which it is caught.1 Not that all 
anthropologists would agree with the analysis that follows. Because it sketches 
the limits of the discipline and exposes its internal logic, some may even find it 
anti-anthropological. I see it differently. My aim is exactly the same as the 
discipline’s own aim, the hopeless and impossible aim of eliminating 
ethnocentrism—hopeless and impossible because paradoxically anthropology 
becomes ethnocentric in the very attempt to defeat ethnocentrism. It is this 
paradox that I wish to highly here. 
The debate concerns what for most of the twentieth century has been the 
discipline’s key analytical category—culture—whether it is up to the task at 
hand or whether we are not all, anthropologists and the people we study, better 
off replacing it with an entirely different category—ontology.2 To turn first to the 
anthropological task, let us note that from its inception as an academic discipline 
in the nineteenth century, the key premise of anthropology has been the 
principle of human unity, the idea that human beings are essentially and 
fundamentally the same. Hence the problem—the ‘ethnological problem’, as 
anthropology’s foremost historian, George Stocking 1987: 50), calls it—has 
always been how to uphold this principle of unity or sameness in the face of 
often radical, empirical difference. The anthropological task then, has been to 
demonstrate that although different, others are people like us, that their 
otherness is both different—for it must be taken seriously and not simply 
explained away—and the same and the same time. In effect, the task has been to 
manage, to the extent that can be managed, this very logical contradiction. As 
Stocking says, in the nineteenth century the ethnological problem was about 
‘demonstrating the unity of the human species’—or the ‘psychic unity of 
mankind’, as the foremost Victorian anthropologist, E.B. Tylor, famously put it—
that is, affirming what is denied by racism. In the twentieth century, it became in 
addition about demonstrating what we might call ‘the unity of human culture’, 
that is, affirming what is denied by ethnocentrism. This is why, as Geertz says in 
a seminal essay, twentieth century anthropology sought ‘a more viable concept 
of man’, one where cultural diversity is taken seriously and not explained away 
and ‘at the same time, one in which the governing principle of the field, “the basic 
unity of mankind”, would not be turned into an empty phrase’ (Geertz 1973: 36; 
my emphasis). 
Managing the contradiction entailed in the anthropological task is easier 
said than done. As I have argued elsewhere (Argyrou 2002), there is no 
anthropological paradigm in which cultural difference does not emerge as 
cultural inferiority, not a single one that has not been found guilty of 
ethnocentrism. No better proof of this is the impatient, radical, overarching and 
badly misunderstood critique of anthropology by another turn—the 
‘postmodern turn’ of the 1980s. Much like postmodernism in other human 
sciences, the critique was epistemological, in this case, a critique of 
anthropological representations as ‘fictions’ and ‘partial truths’ (Clifford 1986), 
an argument misread by many as anti-anthropological. A careful consideration of 
the postmodern claim however, suggests that not all representations were meant 
to be understood in this way, certainly not the ‘governing principle of the field’, 
the idea of human unity or sameness. Without this representation the critique of 
the discipline would not be possible. For how can anyone know that 
anthropological representations are fictions without a representation to act as 
the standard of truth? My argument then, was that although not readily 
apparent, the postmodern critique sought to safeguard this fundamental idea of 
sameness from whatever representations arose in the discipline that 
contradicted it. It sought to do exactly what the discipline itself has been striving 
to do: to solve ‘the ethnological problem’ by demonstrating that although 
different the otherness of the other is also the same as the sameness of the self. 
 Such, I will contend in this paper, is also the desire that motivates ‘the 
ontological turn’—the latest push that keeps anthropology turning and going 
round and round in circles. This, I wish to argue, is ultimately the reason for 
proposing to replace the notion of culture with the notion of ontology. To put the 
matter rather schematically, having come to the same realisation as the 
‘postmodernists’ a few decades earlier—that no matter how well intended, 
anthropological representations cannot avoid being ethnocentric—‘ontological 
anthropologists’ sought ways and means of neutralising them. The difference, 
subtle but significant, is that for these latter anthropologists what is at fault is 
not representation per se—hence for some (e.g. Holbraad, 2012) it is not a 
matter of questioning the possibility of truth either. For them the problem is not 
epistemological but ontological. 
What ontology is supposed to mean exactly in this context is not entirely 
clear not least because, as one anthropologist associated with the ‘turn’ admits, it 
is possible ‘that some ontologists themselves are unclear about what it is they 
are advocating (Salmond 2014: 159). In general the argument has been read as 
suggesting the existence of different worlds—our world and the worlds of the 
people we study. As we shall see, this reading is consistent with the work of one 
of the leading figures of the ‘turn’, Viveiros de Castro, and the argument of 
‘multinaturalism’. And while some ‘ontological’ anthropologists dispute this 
reading and argue that the notion of ontology is a heuristic, methodological 
device (e.g. Holbraad 2012), others accept it as a theoretical innovation to be 
proud of (Pedersen 2012: no pagination). Whatever the case, they all seem to 
agree that the problem is ontological rather than epistemological because of the 
existence of different ‘ontologies’ in the world, which is to say, different 
definitions of reality or better still different truths about reality and not simply 
different representations of it (Salmond 2014). 
 
Taking seriously and doing justice 
In my own work I also argued that anthropology’s problem is not 
epistemological but ontological. Because Viveiros de Castro (2003) referred to 
this argument and because what I meant is very different from what ‘ontological 
anthropologists’ mean, I feel it is necessary to clarify my position before 
proceeding further. 
In the paper that Viveiros de Castro refers to and the book that followed 
(Argyrou, 2002), I was raising the question as to whether the problem that 
anthropology strives to solve is solvable. And I was saying, drawing on 
authorities of the likes of Hegel and Derrida, that it is not solvable because 
difference is an inescapable part of the world. Put simply, without difference the 
world would be Pure Being, which, as Hegel argued, is nothing. This is what I 
meant with ‘ontological problem’. I was saying that the kind of unity that the 
discipline presumes would appear if only ethnocentrism was not in the way—
‘Pure Humanity’, as I called it elsewhere (Argyrou 2005) after Hegel’s notion of 
Pure Being—cannot appear. Whether we like it or not, in society and history 
there can be no such unity. 
Had I been aware at the time of Derrida’s (1994) book Specters of Marx, I 
would have said that anthropology’s problem is ‘hauntological’, as this idea 
captures its nature more precisely. As others have noted (e.g. Peim 2005) this 
notion is a variation on earlier Derridarian themes such as trace, supplement and 
differance. In broader terms still, one can speak of hauntology rather than 
ontology because, as Derrida and before him Heidegger have shown, Being does 
not appear in the empirical world and cannot be present. Yet although it is 
nowhere to be found in society and history, Being is not ‘nothing’. After all, we 
think it, name it, speak about it—every time we use the word ‘is’, says Heidegger, 
we name Being even though we have no idea what it might be. My contention 
then, is that a similar case can be made about the state of human unity, purity 
and innocence that anthropologists implicitly posit in their struggle against 
ethnocentrism. Following Derrida’s playful use of the theme of the spectre or 
ghost that exists and does not exist, is present and not present, we may say that 
anthropology’s problem is hauntological or spectral. What it considers to be real 
is a ghost, present as a disembodied, insubstantial, immaterial being, but 
precisely because of this not present, since a body without substance, 
materiality, flesh and blood, is not a real being but a vision, a phantom, an 
apparition. 
Yet liminality—being neither here nor there, neither present nor absent, 
dead or alive—does not exhaust the idea of the hauntological. Unlike liminality it 
is unsettling, the return of the repressed that disturbs and spooks the living. It is 
this aspect of the hauntological that has been especially influential in the human 
sciences; and it is this too that has come under attack by critics, for example, for 
being apolitical, sacrificing specificity and the possibility of critique for a 
generalised, ‘vacuous’ structure (Luckhurst 2002). The structure is no doubt 
general but this does not make it vacuous or apolitical. It certainly helps us to 
understand why anthropologists are possessed by the idea of Pure Humanity and 
obsessed with it, why we seem unable to rest until we accomplish what it is 
demanding of us: to demonstrate that it is a real being rather than a phantom, a 
possible experience rather than a figment of the imagination. Hence the fact that 
every failure to do so acts as a spur for another attempt, the latest being the 
ontological. It should be clear then, that something is haunting us—something 
dark, lurking in the shadows behind or below the state of plenitude promised by 
Pure Humanity. I shall return to this in the last section of the paper. 
In contrast to this reading of anthropology’s ontological problem—as a 
problem of haunting—there is the meaning attached to it by the anthropologists 
of the ‘ontological turn’. For them the discipline has an ontological rather than 
epistemological problem because it fails to take into account other realities or, at 
any rate, other truths about reality. It assumes that there is one reality or nature 
shared by everyone and merely different ways of representing, understanding, 
living it, in short, different cultures. It further assumes without explicitly saying 
so that our understanding of this common reality—and this is where 
ethnocentrism rears its head—is superior to the understanding of everyone else. 
As we have seen, the ontological argument—to the extent that there is only 
one—is that there are different ontologies in the world, not simply different 
representations of it. This could mean that there is one reality and different 
truths about it, in which case, as with different representations, a decision needs 
to be made as to which truth is ‘the truth’. ‘Different ontologies’ could also mean 
different realities or as Vieverios de Castro (1998, 2004, 2013, 2014), seems to 
suggest with the term ‘multinaturalism’, different natures or worlds. Whatever 
the case, the ontological argument implies that contrary to what I am suggesting 
here, the ethnological problem may be solvable. What needs to be done, it seems, 
is ‘simply’ to recognise that our representations are limited and need to be 
reconceptualised, redefined and refined until the contradictions that ‘tempt you 
to say that your informants are being “irrational”’ (Holbraad 2012: 255) are 
removed.3 A happy end to the story, one might say. But perhaps there is no end 
let alone a happy one, perhaps the end is also the beginning and the more we 
strive the faster we go round and round in circles. Let us look at the ontological 
argument in greater detail. 
 A key claim of the ontological turn is that anthropologists do not take 
native cultures seriously and do not do them justice (e.g. Viveiros de Castro, 
2003; Henare et al, 2007; Pedersen, 2011)—a claim that itself appears not to be 
taken all that seriously by critics (e.g. Heywood, 2012; Laidlaw and Heywood, 
2013). This may be partly due to the odd, and as far as I can tell odd one out self-
admission that ‘the ontological turn takes itself seriously’ only to a ‘limited 
degree’ (Pedersen, 2012: no pagination). But it is also partly due to our 
assumption—not unjustifiable—that if there is an academic discipline that has 
been treating native cultures with seriousness and respect this is anthropology. 
It seems however, that there may be more substance to the ontological claim 
than it appears at first sight.  
 It concerns the way we treat the otherness of the other when it blatantly 
contradicts what we take to be true. The easy way to deal with such 
contradictions is to say that what others think, say, or do is wrong, or irrational, 
or absurd, or some such. But anthropologists are not in the business of 
dismissing otherness as lack and cultural inferiority. As we have said, 
ethnocentrism is the archenemy and needs to be defeated at all costs. The only 
way out of this difficulty—assuming there is one—is to argue that what others 
think, say or do refers to something other than what they think it refers to, that it 
is rational and meaningful but in a way they are unaware of, that it does make 
sense but in a way they do not understand. In this way the contradiction is 
removed, but—and this is a big ‘but’—ethnocentrism remains firmly in place. 
Unwillingly and unwittingly, anthropologists reproduce it by claiming for 
themselves superior knowledge of native life. It is correct then, to say that 
anthropologists do not do justice to native culture. Insofar as they explain it as 
something other than what natives take it to be, they explain it away. Yet this is 
not intentional, as ontological anthropologists seem to suggest. It is the 
inevitable outcome of the impossibility of human unity or sameness. Let us look 
at a few examples of how anthropologists explain native cultures away used in 
the ontological literature. 
Take the Nuer claim that ‘twins are birds’, says Holbraad (2010: 184). 
Apparently they ‘assert what we take to be false. If we know what “twin” means 
and what “bird” means at all we also know that twins are not birds. No amount of 
relativist fudge can get us out of the fact that, as far as we are concerned, the 
Nuer are saying something wrong’. In fact, as far as we are concerned, they are 
saying something so obviously wrong that the anthropologist may be tempted to 
say what she is not supposed to say—that ‘they are being irrational’. As they 
cannot/must not be irrational, they must be saying something other than what 
they are saying, something they are unaware of saying. As Holbraad notes, 
anthropological paradigms have come up with all sorts of suggestions as to what 
natives might be saying when they say (or do) apparently irrational things, such 
as that ‘twins are birds’: 
Is it because thinking in this way serves some purpose for 
them (functionalism)? Is it because of something about the 
way the brain works (cognitivism)? Is this because such a 
view makes sense in the context of other views that they 
hold (interpretivism)? Or are they just being metaphorical 
in some way (symbolism)? (Holbraad, 2010: 183). 
 We can wholeheartedly agree with Holbraad that all these paradigms—and 
others he does not mentioned, such as structuralism—explain native culture 
away and that in this sense they do not take it seriously and do not do it justice. 
This is also what Viveiros de Castro argues, but in a way that I find highly 
problematic. For it implies intentions that are not present and draws attention 
away from the real problem, which is structural. 
What makes the native a native is the presumption, on the 
part of the anthropologist, that the native’s relationship 
with his culture is natural, which is to say, intrinsic, 
spontaneous, and, if possible, nonreflexive or, even better, 
unconscious. Thus the native gives expression to her 
culture in his discourse. The anthropologist does so too, 
but if he hopes to be something other than a native, he must 
also be able to express his culture culturally, which is to 
say, reflexively, conditionally, and consciously (Viveiros de 
Castro, 2013: 475; my emphases). 
Thus, Viveiros de Castro goes on to say, although the notion of culture places the 
native and the anthropologist on equal footing—as they both have a culture—
this equality is only de facto and ‘does not imply equality de jure—that is, an 
equality with regard to their respective claims to knowledge. The anthropologist 
tends to have an epistemological advantage over the native’ (2013: 474). 
Viveiros de Castro is right in saying that the anthropologist emerges as someone 
who knows native culture better than the native. What is problematic is the 
presumed ‘presumption’ and ‘hope’ of the anthropologist. It imputes an intention 
that seems to me to be totally alien to how anthropologists think—the intention 
of distinguishing themselves and asserting the superiority of their culture vis-à-
vis native cultures. Holbraad (2010: 184) makes a similar claim. He diagnoses 
lack of humility on the part of anthropologists and considers ‘the culturalist take 
on alterity [to be] downright presumptuous’. As he goes on to say, the 
‘culturalists imagine for themselves unlimited powers of comprehension’. 
It may be argued of course that this is merely a hyperbolic way of 
speaking about the ‘culturalists’. The ‘ontologists’, it could be said, are well aware 
that what motivates anthropologists is not the desire to distinguish themselves 
and their culture but, on the contrary, the desire to take native cultures seriously. 
But if that is the case the ‘ontologists’ must do two things: firstly, recognise that 
there is a paradox and highlight it, secondly explain in some detail how their own 
efforts are able to overcome it. This is something that to my knowledge no one in 
the ontological camp (or anyone else in anthropology for that matter) has done. 
Hence the need for a paper such as this that does highlight the paradox and 
raises the question of whether anyone can overcome it. My contention is that no 
one can. Anthropologists, including those of the ontological turn, have no choice 
in the matter. Whenever something in native culture contradicts what they take 
to be true, they cannot afford to take it seriously and must explain it away. Either 
this or give in to the temptation that Holbraad identifies—to brand it irrational 
and in this way become consciously ethnocentric. Since the latter is not an option, 
they must presume that what natives say or do has no intrinsic value in and of 
itself and that the real value is to be found in what, what they say or do says or 
does behind their back. Such is the anthropological predicament. 
 As we have said, anthropologists of the ontological turn think that by 
positing different worlds or different truths about the world, as the case may be, 
they can overcome this predicament. If, say, the Nuer truth about reality is 
different from ours, then perhaps what they (or anyone else for that matter) say 
about twins and birds (or anything else that strikes us as irrational) may not 
contradict what we know to be the truth. ‘The Nuer may appear to be asserting 
that twins are birds but may in fact be saying something quite different—
something we fail to grasp, not because it contradicts what we assume to be true 
about twins, but rather because it goes beyond our own assumptions’. In other 
words, if the Nuer truth about reality is different from ours what counts as twins 
when they say that twins are birds may be very different from what it counts 
when we say they are human beings. If so, the task of anthropology becomes 
rather different. ‘Instead of explanation or interpretation, what is called for is 
conceptualization’ (Holbraad, 2010: 183-84). Interpretation and explanation will 
simply explain native life away and not get us very far. If we truly wish to 
understand other societies, and if we wish to do them justice, we must be 
prepared to refine, redefine, reconceptualise our categories. And we should keep 
doing so until claims like ‘twins are birds’ no longer strikes us as irrational, until 
the reconceptualised categories render definitions such as that by Afro-Cuban 
diviners ‘of powder as power reasonable, rather than absurd’ (Holbraad, 2011: 
14). At that point the anthropological task would have been completed and the 
ethnological problem solved. 
 
‘The ethnological problem’ 
 Viveiros de Castro’s argument of multi-naturalism draws inspiration from what 
he calls ‘Amerindian perspectivism’, indigenous ideas about how humans, 
animals and spirits see themselves and one another. As we have said, this theory 
is a symmetrical inversion of Western ‘“multiculturalist” cosmologies’—‘perhaps 
too symmetrical to be more than speculative’, Viveiros de Castro admits (1998: 
470). While Western ontology posits the unity of nature and the plurality of 
cultures, Amerindian perspectivism posits the unity of culture and the plurality 
of natures. Because of the plurality of natures, the main protagonists in this 
drama see each other differently: humans see themselves as humans, animals as 
animals and spirits as spirits, while from their perspective animals (predators) 
and spirits see humans as animals (prey) and animals (prey) see humans as 
spirits or animals (predators). Because of the universality of culture, on the other 
hand, all the protagonists see themselves in the same way: animals and spirits 
see themselves as humans and experience what they do in the form of culture. 
They see their food as human food (jaguars see blood as 
manioc beer, vultures see the maggots in rotting meat as 
grilled fish, etc.) … their bodily attributes (fur, feathers, 
claws, beaks, etc.) as body decorations or cultural 
instruments … their social system as organized in the same 
way as human institutions are (with chiefs, shamans, 
ceremonies, exogamous moieties, etc.) (Viveiros de Castro, 
1998: 470). 
 The theory has been criticised on all sorts of grounds, some of them more 
justifiable than others. If one were to take stock, one could perhaps mention first 
criticisms of an empirical nature. Thus, experts in Amazonian ethnography have 
dismissed Viveiros de Castro’s portrayal of indigenous ideas as a 
‘misrepresentation and mistranslation of the form, content and meaning’ of 
Amazonian cultural systems. This, the argument goes on, is the result of 
developing the ontological claims not on the basis of ethnographic data but 
through a kind of ‘philosophical dialogue between ideal-typical formulations’ of 
modernist and Amazonian ideas (Turner, 2009: 18).  In a similar vein Ramos 
(2012: 482) criticises Viveiros de Castro for giving the ‘false impression’ that the 
Amazon is a homogenous cultural area, thereby slipping into ‘reductionism, 
oversimplification and overinterpretation’ (2012: 483). In addition, Ramos 
criticises de Castro for diminishing ‘the intellectual value of indigenous thinking’ 
through the use of such terms as cosmology, myth and cannibalism (Ramos, 
2012: 485). For others (e.g. Bessire and Bond, 2014: 449-50) the major problem 
with the theory is that it ‘defers’ the critique of ‘actually existing politics’ and 
‘real-world collisions and contradictions’ in favour of ‘a message of messianic 
redemption’ of indigenous populations—as if, we may note in disagreement, the 
redemption of otherness is not a political issue and not part of the real world. 
More justifiable is Bessire and Bond’s observation that the theory ‘polices’ the 
Great Divide between the modern and the nonmodern, although the use of the 
term ‘polices’ is problematic as it suggests that this is done intentionally. Still 
other critics (e.g. Vigh and Sausdal, 2014) raise methodological questions about 
the possibility of anthropologists ever being able to understand something that is 
posited as completely other. They also express concerns about essentialising 
difference and how such images of radical alterity could be exploited outside 
academia for political reasons—as if, we may note again in disagreement, the 
inability to control the uses of one’s discourse ought to prevent it from 
circulating in the first place. 
 This is by no means an exhaustive summary of criticisms but nor is it 
meant to be. It is, I think, a fairly representative sample of what has been said 
about the ontological turn hence a good indication also of what remains to be 
said. And there is much to be said, as my concern here is not to criticise the 
‘ontological turn’ (and not to praise it either). Rather it is first, to show that it 
constitutes the latest attempt to grapple with the ‘ethnological problem’ in its 
twentieth and twenty-first century version—the redemption of the otherness of 
the other as the elimination ethnocentrism; and second, to examine if it can solve 
this problem and succeed where all other anthropological paradigms have failed. 
It may be clear perhaps from what has just been said that my view of the 
ontological turn is very different from the view of Bessire, Bond and others in the 
same camp. For them the ‘turn’ is merely an epiphenomenon of a much more 
‘substantial’ reality: ‘we assert that the soteriological figure of ontological alterity 
is a crucial metanarrative of late liberalism’ (2014: 450; my emphases). In 
‘asserting’ this conviction however, they miss the mark completely, since it can 
be easily shown that the redemption of ‘alterity’ has been the ‘crucial 
metanarrative’ of all anthropology since its inception as an academic discipline. 
As I have already noted, what I wish to do here is to examine whether ontological 
anthropology can succeed in its aim to redeem the otherness of the other. In this 
respect I find more relevant the argument made by a number of other critics, 
even if for reasons different from my own: that in positing multiple realities or 
natures (even if, I will argue below, only as a methodological, heuristic device) 
the theory presupposes a meta-ontology, a definition of a world that contains 
different worlds (e.g. Laidlaw, 2012; Heywood, 2012; Keane, 2013; Laidlaw and 
Heywood, 2013). 
I shall return to this point below. Here I should note that in a certain sense 
some of the critics discussed above have already answered the question that I am 
posing here, namely, whether ontological anthropology can avoid ethnocentrism. 
As we have seen, it has been criticised for reproducing the Great Divide between 
the modern and the nonmodern, essentialising alterity, diminishing the value of 
indigenous knowledge through the use of ‘inappropriate’ vocabulary and so on 
and so forth. Yet although these criticisms are not wrong, they are piecemeal 
responses to what I think is a more general and systemic problem in which all 
anthropology is implicated. The issue then, is not simply that ontological 
anthropology cannot avoid ethnocentrism. It is, rather, that it cannot avoid it, for 
the same reasons that every other anthropological paradigm before it could not. 
Because these critics do not recognise or do not wish to recognise the nature and 
extent of the problem, they fail to raise the question as to whether it is solvable 
at all, and if not, why not—which is what I wish to do here. Yet the problem 
cannot be swept under the carpet. That is why every few decades there appear 
heroic attempts to solve it—the most recent being the postmodern, and now the 
ontological turn. 
For some of the critics discussed here, taking others seriously and 
learning from them can be done without positing multiple worlds. ‘We should be 
open to the possibility that what we learn from our ethnography can tell us 
something we don’t already know about what kinds of things there are in the 
world’, says Laidlaw (2012: no pagination) in his review of Pedersen’s book on 
Mongolian shamanism. ‘This is an important proposition for anthropology’, he 
goes on to say, but there is no need to posit other ontological realms ‘where 
things can be true without having to be true for the rest of us’. Doing so is both 
‘unsustainable’ and ‘unnecessary’. Perhaps, but the issue here is not whether we 
can learn something that we do not already know. Rather, it is what to do in all 
those cases where what we already know to be true is contradicted by what we 
learn from our ethnography, where what is true for them is not true for the rest 
of us. This is the question that the ‘ontological turn’ is raising. 
For others who recognise the aim of ontological anthropology in more 
explicit terms—that ‘taking seriously’ ultimately means ‘taking indigenous 
systems of knowledge on equal intellectual terms’—this aim has not been 
achieved because ‘the voice we hear is not indigenous, but an alien verbalization’ 
(Ramos, 2012: 490). This claim seems to me to show little understanding of the 
magnitude and complexity of the problem we are dealing with. If one were to 
take it seriously one would have to assume that indigenous voices are not 
already indebted to their imputed intellectual superiors, hence have not lost the 
game before it has even begun: that they can recognise and find relevant and 
meaningful the issue of intellectual and more broadly cultural inequality without 
prior schooling; that they will be heard, understood and taken seriously in a 
language other than the dominant academic language; that they will express 
ideas that are not simply the dominant ideas of the dominant party but somehow 
universal and belonging to them as much as to anyone else. As if to confirm that 
none of these conditions apply, hence that her argument cannot be taken 
seriously, Ramos gives as an example of an indigenous voice that can speak 
authentically the ‘auto-ethnography’ of a Baniwa Indian ‘who recently received 
his doctoral degree in anthropology’ (2012: 490). 
 
‘The Politics of Ontology’ 
 Let us then, turn to the politics of ontological anthropology and look at it in more 
detail. The first thing to say is that there are no surprises here. As Candea (2014) 
rightly points out, for what comes across as a highly unconventional paradigm—
one that posits the existence of different worlds or different truths about the 
world and the need for a ‘permanent’ conceptual ‘revolution’ to understand them 
(Holbraad et al., 2014)—its politics is highly conventional. What is more, this 
politics is not subject to any sort of re-conceptualisation, let alone revolution. It 
is highly conventional and is bound to remain so. 
‘The politics of ontology’ (Holbraad et al., 2014) is not the politics of the 
other, another kind of politics—let us say for the sake of argument, the politics of 
‘hierarchy’ (Dumont, 1980). It is our very own politics of equality and freedom, 
which presumes that this state of plenitude can be achieved by means of 
thinking, the politics of the Enlightenment that Kant captured so well with the 
motto of the Enlightenment: think for yourself. Think for yourself and take 
nothing for granted (as a grant or gift) if you wish to be a self-determining, 
autonomous being. Hence the battles over minds, ways of thinking and 
definitions of reality that are characteristic of this politics and the theories that 
seek to explain how minds are captured and how they can be set free—ideology, 
hegemony, or more recently Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence. As Hage 
(2012: 303) rightly points out, Viveiros de Castro’s theory of multiple realities is 
quite similar to Bourdieu’s theory, at least insofar as in both cases ‘certain 
realities come to dominate over others, so much so that they become simply 
“reality”’. This is why the ‘mission’ of ontological anthropology ‘is to promote the 
“permanent decolonization of thought”’, why the discipline is envisaged as ‘“the 
science of the ontological self-determination of the world’s peoples”’ (Holbraad 
et al, 2014: no pagination; Viveiros de Castro, 2014). It is because our definition 
of reality dominates over the definitions of the rest of the world to such an extent 
that it becomes ‘reality’ as such. Hence the need to have the minds of the world’s 
peoples decolonised and their thinking set free. If it is set free, they can begin to 
think and decide for themselves the nature of reality—they can become 
‘ontologically self-determining’. If they become ontologically self-determining 
they become autonomous like us. If they become like us, their otherness is 
redeemed as it is now shown to be the same as the sameness of the self. The 
ethnological problem is solved and anthropology’s job is done. 
The ‘conventionalism’ of the ‘ontological turn’ should not be at all 
surprising. It is what one would expect from an anthropological paradigm and a 
discipline whose rationale and reason for existence is the redemption of 
otherness. Nor, as we have said, can these ideas become ‘anthropology’s 
business’ if by that we understand what the protagonists of ontological 
anthropology mean: the ‘business to generate alternative vantages from which 
established forms of thinking are put under relentless pressure by alterity itself, 
and perhaps change’ (Holbraad et al., 2014: no pagination). Perhaps some of 
those assumptions and ideas of ours that render things in native life irrational or 
absurd are put under pressure to change. But this process has a limit and this is 
where it is reached—when it comes to our ideas about freedom and equality. For 
these ideas are the very rationale of whatever reconceptualization is supposed to 
take place and themselves are not subject to it. Without these ideas there would 
be no ethnological problem hence no need for ethnology, whether ontological or 
of any other kind. 
 What remains to be explored is how ontological anthropology fails to 
solve the ethnological problem. Let us note to begin with, that the ‘ontological 
self-determination’ of the world’s peoples and the ‘permanent decolonization of 
their thought’ is a giving, therefore, also a taking—not only by those who are at 
the receiving end but also by those who are doing the giving. It is a giving, not of 
something material of course, but something symbolic—the gift of ‘ontology’, the 
‘ontological’ as a gift, which is to say, the empowerment of the world’s peoples to 
think and decide for themselves the nature of reality. ‘The idea of an ontological 
self-determination of peoples should not be confused with supporting ethnic 
essentialization [and] Bult und Boden primordialism…. It means giving the 
ontological back to “the people”, not the people back to “the ontological”’ 
(Holbraad et al., 2014: no pagination; my emphasis). It should not be confused 
because this sort of essentialisation divides people, which is hardly what 
ontological anthropology is striving to do. Yet even when this self-determination 
is not confused for something else, division is unavoidable. It has always already 
happened and there is nothing anyone can do to stop it from happening. In 
empowering the ‘world’s peoples’, ontological anthropology is also 
disempowering them. It gives but it also takes, and it takes more than it gives. 
Having been given ‘the ontological’ the world’s peoples are now 
empowered to think for themselves. Yet even if they begin to think for 
themselves, they would still not be thinking for themselves. The paradox, not 
readily apparent perhaps but massively present, is that to think for themselves 
they must not think for themselves. They must take the motto of the 
Enlightenment for granted as an ontological grant or gift, which is to say, they 
must accept it without questioning it—otherwise, it would mean that they 
already enlightened and not in need of this gift. If they take it for granted, they 
are by definition not thinking for themselves. If they do not take it for granted 
and refuse to accept it, they are also by definition not thinking for themselves. 
Any way one looks at it, there can be no such thing as thinking for oneself. As I 
have argued elsewhere (Argyrou, 2013), in promoting the motto of the 
Enlightenment Kant clearly wished to liberate people from their ‘guardians’. Yet 
he could only do so by becoming their guardian himself. To put it in terms of the 
present discussion, he maintained an ‘epistemological’ advantage over them. He 
knew what they did not know and had to be taught—that the only way to be 
autonomous is to take nothing for granted. This is also the case with ontological 
anthropologists and how they end up being ethnocentric. Unwillingly and 
unwittingly no doubt, they become the guardians of the world’s peoples. They 
seek to liberate them in the only way possible—by teaching them what they do 
not know, hence making them dependent. The equality between anthropologist 
and native achieved through the decolonisation of native thought is instantly 
transformed into an asymmetrical relation, the epistemological advantage of the 
former over the latter is maintained. 
 There is another way of looking at the workings of this sort of inadvertent 
ethnocentrism. As a number of critics have pointed out, quite rightly so, 
ontological anthropology operates with a meta-ontology—the definition of a 
reality in which there are different realities, a world that consists of many worlds 
(Laidlaw, 2012; Heywood, 2012; and Laidlaw and Heywood, 2013). As Heywood 
(2012: 146) puts it, ontological anthropologists ‘neglect to acknowledge that 
insisting on the “reality” of multiple worlds commits you to a meta-ontology in 
which such worlds exist’. For Heywood this is problematic because it is 
inconsistent with the ontological anthropologists’ empirical claims—that it is 
things themselves rather than theories that point to the existence of multiple 
ontologies. But there is another problem here, which is far more important: the 
way in which this meta-ontology impacts on the relationship between 
anthropologist and native. Put simply, it reproduces, albeit at another level, the 
very asymmetry between native and anthropological discourses that ontological 
anthropology strives to eliminate. 
 As we have seen in their effort to show that natives are people like us, 
anthropologists must do something about all those things in native life that 
contradict what we know to be true. They must reinterpret them and argue that 
in ‘reality’ there is no contradiction or that it exists only because natives are not 
aware of the ‘real’ meaning and purpose of their beliefs and practices. Positing 
lack of this sort of awareness however—lack of reflexivity, not thinking for 
oneself but taking for granted—makes natives inferior to us and defeats the 
object of the exercise. With ontological anthropology this move is reversed. If 
there are things in native life that appear to contradict what we know to be true 
this is only because we do not know the real meaning and purpose of these 
things. Our categories of understanding are not up to the task of making sense of 
other lives and other worlds. Once again the contradictions emerge as more 
apparent than real but in this case the integrity of native discourse is preserved.  
We must assume that natives know the true meaning and purpose of what they 
say and do, much like we assume that we know the true meaning and purpose of 
what we say and do. The equality with regard to our respective claims to 
knowledge that was only de facto now becomes at long last also de jure. But does 
it? 
 Despite the ontological efforts, the anthropologist’s and the native’s 
claims are still not equal whether de facto or de jure. The anthropologist still has 
an epistemological advantage over the native and can claim superior knowledge. 
And this is true irrespective of how one reads the ontological argument—as a 
claim about different worlds or different truths about the world. The claims may 
be equal when it comes to the knowledge they have of their respective 
worlds/truths but if what ontological anthropology says is anything to go by, this 
knowledge does not exhaust reality/truth and what can be known about it. The 
anthropologists’ world/truth and the natives’ world/truth do not exist in 
isolation. If the former can encounter the latter and are able to study them, it 
must be because they share some sort of common ground, a world/truth or 
universe that contains their respective worlds/truths. Yet although common to 
both, it is only (ontological) anthropologists who know anything about this 
reality/truth, even if the only thing they may know is simply that it exists. This is 
the knowledge they claim to have when they speak of 
multinaturalism/respective truths, the meta-ontology they neglect to 
acknowledge but are nonetheless ‘committed’ to, as Heywood says. 
A concrete example would perhaps make this asymmetry clearer. In a 
recent paper Holbraad uses the example of Maori gifts to argue against reading 
Viveiros de Castro’s ‘perspectivism’ as positing different worlds. The usual way 
of relating the encounter between the Maori and the anthropologist, Holbraad 
says, is to say that while the former see a spirit in the gift (that of the owner), the 
latter see merely an object. The perspectivist account, by contrast, argues that 
the difference is not between two ways of ‘seeing’ the gift but of conceiving what 
the gift is. The analogy with Amerindian perspectivism, Holbraad (2016: no 
pagination) goes on to say, is ‘strict’. The ‘anthropologist and native “see in the 
same way” inasmuch as they both “see” gift’. But for the anthropologist the gift is 
a mere object, while for the Maori it is an object imbued with spirit. In effect, the 
gift is two different things, and this is what it means to say that the difference is 
ontological. 
Whatever we say about this reading of ‘perspectivism’, one thing is 
certain: it does not solve the problem we are dealing with. The (ontological) 
anthropologist still has an epistemological advantage over the native. It should 
be clear that the (ontological) anthropologist has a perspective on this encounter 
that is neither the perspective of the Maori nor of the (non-ontological) 
anthropologist. It is a perspective that contains both—a meta-perspective—and 
makes possible a truth that contains both the truth of the Maori and of the (non-
ontological) anthropologist. In short, the ontological anthropologist knows what 
the other two actors do not know: that there are different truths as to what gift is 
or that the gift can be different things and that, presumably, neither the Maori 
nor the (non-ontological) anthropologist should dismiss each other’s truth. 
 
Conclusion: The ‘hauntological’ 
I have said above that in giving the ontological as a gift to the world’s peoples, 
anthropologists also take. They take from the world’s peoples themselves, no 
doubt—symbolic things like recognition, admiration, gratitude and so on—but 
not only from them. By way of concluding this paper, I would like to pursuit the 
idea of taking by means of giving a bit further because it will help us clarify the 
‘hauntological’ a little more. This, as we have said, is the claim that 
anthropologists are possessed by, and obsessed with the idea of human unity, so 
much so that they will not rest until they demonstrate that it is an empirical 
reality, not simply a figment of the imagination. 
The first thing to note here is that anthropologists take something in 
return long before they give the ontological as a gift. They take as soon as the 
thought crosses their mind that the ontological could be given to the world’s 
peoples as a gift. At that very instant they take, and they take far more than what 
they will eventually give. This is to say, as Derrida (1994) does in his discussion 
of Mauss’s classic The Gift, that giving is taking with a certain capitalisation, in 
effect, that there is no such thing as a gift. What do anthropologists take then, by 
means of this giving? I will be thoroughly anthropological here and turn to a 
well-known essay on religion by Clifford Geertz (1973b). Religion, says Geertz, is 
a cultural system that maintains a vision (or the illusion) of conceptual, ethical 
and emotional order in the world. It does so by explaining the exception and the 
anomaly thus bolstering the belief that we can understand whatever arises, make 
sound moral judgements in every circumstance, deal effectively with pain and 
suffering, in short, that we are in control. Can this help us at all to make sense of 
the ‘ontological turn’ and more broadly of what keeps anthropology turning 
more than a century now? I think so. The need to believe in the existence of an 
ethical order seems to me to be the stake in giving the world’s peoples the ‘gift’ of 
recognition. If we wish to ‘do justice’ to their way of life, it is because we need to 
believe that there is justice in the world, that profanities like ethnocentrism exist 
not because they are inherent in reality, not because there is no moral order and 
anything goes, but because of regrettable but happily rectifiable things like 
misunderstanding, ignorance, arrogance, greed and so on. What we take through 
this giving is the assurance that our world is morally grounded and that we are 
safe. 
Perhaps not many anthropologists will be prepared to accept this reading 
of what we do and why we do it. If there is any truth in it however—and I think 
there is—it goes some way in explaining the ‘haunting’, the fact that 
anthropologists are possessed by, and obsessed with human unity, the plenitude 
of human purity and innocence. We must persist in our efforts to demonstrate 
this unity, despite all past failures. What is at stake is nothing less than the moral 
order of the world. This is to say that what is haunting us is the suspicion ‘that 
perhaps the world … has no genuine order at all … that life is absurd and the 
attempt to make moral, intellectual, or emotional sense out of experience is 
bootless (Geertz 1973b: 108). We may take comfort in the knowledge that we are 
not alone in this. This spectre is haunting others as well. 
  
Notes 
1 This can be done here only briefly and sketchily. For a fuller treatment see 
Argyrou (2002)  
2 See Carrithers et al (2010) for a debate as to whether the latter is another word 
for the former. 
3 I say ‘simply’ because I am simplifying. Holbraad (2012: 255-56) provides a 
detailed, five-step procedure as to how this is supposed to happen.  
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